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COMMENTS
CIVIL RICO: BEFORE AND AFTER SEDIMA
I. INTRODUCTION
A substantial debate has ensued regarding the application
of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
(RICO) to legitimate business enterprises.' Courts disagree as
to whether a broad or narrow interpretation of the statute is
warranted. RICO was enacted in order to provide an addi-
tional enforcement weapon in the war against organized
crime. However, a broad interpretation of the statute has re-
sulted in treble damage liability on respectable business and
commercial enterprises. As a result, some courts created
standing barriers in an attempt to restrict the availability of
the RICO treble damage remedy in private civil actions.
These standing barriers were, however, rejected by other
courts in favor of a broad application of RICO. Courts re-
jecting standing barriers contended that the sweeping imposi-
tion of RICO liability was necessary for RICO to function as
an effective weapon in the fight against organized crime.
In Sedima S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co.,2 the United States
Supreme Court eliminated the two standing barriers applied
most frequently so that RICO could be an effective tool in
combatting organized crime. In dicta, however, the Court en-
couraged the development of a previously underutilized stand-
ing barrier, the "pattern" requirement. 3 Consequently,
Sedima shifted the RICO controversy to a new front.
This Comment will analyze the change in focus on the pri-
vate civil right of action stemming from a RICO violation.
Part II of this Comment will provide essential background in-
1. See, e.g., Blakey, The RICO Civil Fraud Action in Context: Reflections on Ben-
nett v. Berg, 58 NOTRE DAME LAW. 237, 280-83 (1982); Blakey & Gettings, Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO): Basic Concepts - Criminal and Civil
Remedies, 53 TEMP. L.Q. 1009 (1980); Strafer, Massumi & Skolnick, Civil RICO in the
Public Interest: "Everybody's Darling," 19 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 655 (1982); Tarlow,
RICO Revisited, 17 GA. L. REV. 291 (1983).
2. 105 S. Ct. 3275 (1985).
3. Id. at 3287.
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formation. Part III will examine the two previously employed
standing barriers to RICO claims. Part IV will analyze the
Supreme Court's discussion in Sedima and its reasoning. Part
V discusses the new standing limitation created by Sedima.
The Comment concludes with a plea for congressional action
in order to resolve the debate concerning the breadth of the
civil RICO provisions.
II. BACKGROUND
RICO was enacted as Title IX of the Organized Crime
Control Act of 1970.1 The RICO statute provides for a pri-
vate cause of action that enables a successful plaintiff to re-
cover treble damages. The statutory language in section
1964(c) specifically states: "Any person injured in his busi-
ness or property by reason of a violation of section 1962 of
this chapter may sue therefor in any appropriate United States
district court and shall recover threefold the damages he sus-
tains and the cost of the suit, including a reasonable attorney's
fee."' 6 As the quoted language indicates, violation of section
1962 is required in order to invoke the RICO cause of action.7
Section 1962 defines the prohibited conduct.8
4. Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922 (1970) (codified as amended in scattered sec-
tions of 18 and 28 U.S.C. (1982)).
5. See 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1982).
6. Id. Subsection (a) gives the district courts of the United States "[j]urisdiction to
prevent and restrain violations of section 1962 .. " 18 U.S.C. § 1964(a) (1982). Sub-
section (b) enables the Attorney General to institute proceedings in actions brought by
the United States government. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(b) (1982). For further analyses of
these civil remedies, see Note, Equitable Law Enforcement and the Organized Crime
Control Act of 1970 - United States v. Cappetto, 25 DE PAUL L. REV. 508 (1976);
Comment, Organized Crime and the Infiltration of Legitimate Business: Civil Remedies
for "CriminalActivity," 124 U. PA. L. REV. 192 (1975). Subsection (d) states: "A final
judgment or decree rendered in favor of the United States in any criminal proceeding
brought by the United States under this chapter shall estop the defendant from denying
the essential allegations of the criminal offense in any subsequent civil proceedings
brought by the United States." 18 U.S.C. § 1964(d) (1982).
7. See Bays v. Hunter Sav. Ass'n, 539 F. Supp. 1020, 1023 (S.D. Ohio 1982). Sec-
tion 1962 is commonly known as "criminal RICO." Moss v. Morgan Stanley, Inc.,719
F.2d 5, 17 (2d Cir. 1983).
8. Section 1962 provides:
(a) It shall be unlawful for any person who has received any income derived,
directly or indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering activity or through collec-
tion of an unlawful debt in which such person has participated as a principal. ..
to use or invest, directly or indirectly, any part of such income, or the proceeds
of such income, in acquisition of any interest in, or the establishment or opera-
RICO BEFORE AND AFTER SEDIMA
In section 1961 Congress explained several key terms to
assist in the implementation of RICO.9 Most significantly,
"racketeering activities" were defined as violations of any one
of over thirty separate, already existing state and federal stat-
utes.10 These activities have been referred to as the "predicate
acts."'" A "pattern of racketeering" encompasses two viola-
tions of any of the predicate acts within the past ten years. 12
RICO was enacted by Congress to assist in the fight
against organized crime.13 New weapons were needed because
the existing federal and state laws that imposed fines and
prison sentences were ineffective in combating organized
crime. 14 The new weapon, RICO, aims at the "economic
base" of organized crime. 5 The express RICO provisions au-
tion of, any enterprise which is engaged in, or the activities of which affect, inter-
state or foreign commerce ...
(b) It shall be unlawful for any person through a pattern of racketeering activity
or through collection of an unlawful debt to acquire or maintain, directly or
indirectly, any interest in or control of any enterprise which is engaged in, or the
activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce.
(c) It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any enter-
prise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce,
to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enter-
prise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity or collection of unlawful
debt.
(d) It shall be unlawful for any person to conspire to violate any of the provi-
sions of subsections (a), (b), or (c) of this section.
18 U.S.C. § 1962 (1982).
Subsection (c) has been the provision most often used as the basis for RICO actions
because the language "conduct" or "participate" is easily applied to a wide variety of
fact situations. See Long, Treble Damages for Violations of the Federal Securities Laws:
A Suggested Analysis and Application of the RICO Civil Cause of Action, 85 DICK. L.
REv. 201, 231 (1981).
9. See 18 U.S.C. 1961 (1982) (defining "enterprise" and "persons" among other
things).
10. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (1982).
11. Haroco Inc., v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 747 F.2d 384, 388 (7th Cir.
1984), aff'd, 105 S. Ct. 3291 (1985).
12. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5)(1982).
13. Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922, tit. IX § 1 (1970).
14. See S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. 78 (1969). (The Senate Report noted
that "[n]ot a single one of the 'families' of La Cosa Nostra has been destroyed through
criminal prosecutions."). Furthermore, if a mobster were convicted, the syndicate
could easily replace that person. The structure of the criminal organization would re-
main intact. Therefore, a new approach was needed in order to effectively attack the
entirety of organized crime. 115 CONG. REC. 9,567 (1969) (statement of Sen.
McClellan).
15. S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 79-80 (1969).
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thorizing private civil remedies directly attack the mob's eco-
nomic assets by allowing the recovery of treble damages and
attorneys' fees.16
Recently, there has been an explosion of RICO litigation.17
The increase in civil RICO litigation can be attributed to a
number of factors. First, the statutory language is broad
enough for RICO to be applied to a wide variety of factual
situations, including virtually any type of fraud or breach of
contract action. 18 Furthermore, since the provisions of RICO
are not expressly limited to organized crime, a wide variety of
defendants without mob ties have been sued under RICO. 19
Moreover, the opportunity for a successful plaintiff to se-
cure treble damages provides an additional incentive to seek a
RICO claim.2 ° In addition, since the "predicate acts include a
great many state law violations, federal securities law viola-
tions, and federal mail and wire fraud violations, an expansive
interpretation of RICO allows plaintiffs to bring into federal
courts many claims formerly subject only to state jurisdiction,
and to bypass remedial schemes created by Congress."'" Fur-
thermore, although civil RICO is based on the violation of
predicate acts which are predominately criminal laws, the
plaintiff must in most cases satisfy the less rigorous civil "pre-
ponderance" evidentiary standard.2
16. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1982).
17. By 1978, there were only two reported cases involving RICO claims. See
Farmers Bank v. Bell Mortgage Corp., 452 F. Supp. 1278 (D. Del. 1978); Barr v. WUI/
TAS, Inc., 66 F.R.D. 109 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). Only 13 RICO cases were reported up to
early 1981. Long, supra note 8, at 206 n.32. As of early 1984, over 100 RICO decisions
had been published. Siegel, "RICO" Running Amok in Board Rooms, L.A. Times, Feb.
15, 1984, at 1.
18. Accord Sedima S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 741 F.2d 482, 487-88 (2d Cir. 1984),
rev'd, 105 S. Ct. 3275 (1985).
19. A former United States District Attorney for the Southern District of Texas,
Tony Canales, has stated, "Your last name doesn't have to end in a vowel for [RICO] to
apply to you." Houston Post, Sept. 29, 1980, at Cl, col 3.
20. See Parnes v. Heinold Commodities, 548 F. Supp. 20, 23 (N.D. Ill. 1982).
21. Sedima, 741 F.2d at 486. "Litigators, never at a loss for ingenuity, naturally
found the prospect of treble damages under Section 1964(c) (as well as the possibility of
invoking what might otherwise be unavailable federal jurisdiction) very inviting for gar-
den-variety fraud claims." Parnes, 548 F. Supp. at 23.
22. Farmers Bank v. Bell Mortgage Corp., 452 F. Supp. 1278, 1280 (D. Del. 1978)
(preponderance standard applicable in RICO actions). But see Strafer, Massumi &
Skolnick, supra note 1, at 715-17 (advocating a "clear and convincing" standard).
[Vol. 69:395
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Finally, there is a congressional mandate within the stat-
ute itself that the provisions of RICO be "liberally construed
to effectuate its remedial purposes. ' 23 This liberal construc-
tion clause, along with the factors discussed above, supports a
broad interpretation of the RICO statute and has encouraged
the extensive application of RICO. The resulting explosion of
RICO litigation has spawned controversy among courts and
commentators. 24
III. THE FORMER CONTROVERSY
Prior to Sedima, the debate regarding the scope of the
RICO statute centered on two issues. First, there was a ques-
tion concerning the type of injury necessary to permit recov-
ery under the statute. The second issue focused on whether a
prior criminal conviction was a prerequisite to a civil RICO
action. Because of their detailed analysis of these issues, the
"point cases"' 25 were the Second Circuit's decision in Sedima
S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co.26 and the Seventh Circuit's decision in
Haroco, Inc. v. American National Bank & Trust Co.27 Both
of these decisions were ultimately reviewed by the Supreme
Court.
A. Racketeering Injury Requirement
In an effort to narrow the scope of civil RICO, the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals required the plaintiff to allege, in
addition to the RICO elements expressly provided for in the
statute, a "distinct RICO injury." In other words, plaintiffs in
the Second Circuit were required to allege something more
than an injury caused by each of the predicate offenses that
comprise the pattern. 28 By contrast, bare allegations that the
23. The Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 904(a), 84
Stat. 947 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1961) (1982).
24. See, e.g., Pickholz, The Firestorm over Civil RICO, A.B.A. J. 78, 79 (Mar.
1985).
25. Id. at 80.
26. 741 F.2d 482 (2d Cir. 1984), rev'd, 105 S. Ct. 32 (1985).
27. 747 F.2d 384 (7th Cir. 1984), affid, 105 S. Ct. 3291 (1985). The Second Cir-
cuit's opinion in Bankers Trust Co. v. Rhoades, 741 F.2d 511 (2d Cir. 1984), was also
significant "because Sedima must be read together with the decision in Bankers Trust"
for a complete understanding of the Second Circuit's position. Haroco, 747 F.2d at 395.
28. Bankers Trust Co. v. Rhoades, 741 F.2d 511, 516 (2d Cir. 1984). See also
Sedima S.P.R.L. v. Imrex, Co., 741 F.2d 482, 503 (2d Cir. 1984).
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predicate offenses directly or indirectly injured the plaintiff's
business or property were sufficient to sustain a RICO claim
in the Seventh Circuit.2 9
The controversy focused on the language in section
1964(c) which predicates RICO recovery on an injury caused
"by reason of a violation of section 1962. .... -30 The Second
Circuit contended that if Congress merely intended to estab-
lish a remedy for injuries generated solely from the violations
of the predicate acts themselves, then the statutory language
would have read "by reason of a violation of section 1961. " 31
Therefore, defining a RICO injury in terms of a section 1962
violation required "something more" than an injury caused by
the predicate acts of the defendant. In other words, some type
of racketeering injury must be alleged.3 2
However, other courts,3 3 including the Seventh Circuit,34
examined the RICO language and following the plain mean-
ing of section 1964(c), concluded that no distinct racketeering
injury was required. One court noted that the language "con-
tains no requirement for a 'racketeering enterprise injury'; nor
does it limit the protected injury to one sustained 'by reason
of' the racketeering enterprise; it grants civil relief for 'injury'
which logically includes any injury, 'by reason of a violation
of section 1962'." ' 31 The Seventh Circuit distinguished "a
'racketeering injury' from the elements of a RICO cause of
action spelled out explicitly in the statute. . . . [T]he 'racke-
29. Haroco, Inc. v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 747 F.2d 384 (7th Cir.
1984).
30. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1976).
31. Bankers Trust Co. v. Rhoades, 741 F.2d 511, 516 (2d Cir. 1984).
32. Id. Proponents of a racketeering injury requirement encountered problems in
defining a racketeering injury. Alexander Grant & Co. v. Tiffany Indus., 742 F.2d 408,
413 (8th Cir. 1984) ("[A] racketeering enterprise injury is a slippery concept whose
definition has eluded even the courts professing to recognize it"). The Seventh Circuit
noted that the "initial hurdle for proponents of the racketeering injury is to define it."
Haroco, 747 F.2d at 389.
33. See, e.g., Swanson v. Wabash. Inc., 577 F. Supp. 1308, 1318-20 (N.D. Ill. 1983);
Slattery v. Costello, 586 F. Supp. 162, 166-67 (D.D.C. 1983); Yancoski v. E.F. Hutton &
Co., 581 F. Supp. 88, 96 n.19 (E.D. Pa. 1983); Kirschner v. Cable/Tel Corp., 576 F.
Supp. 234, 244 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
34. Haroco, 747 F.2d at 398.
35. Furman v. Cirrito, 741 F.2d 524, 528 (2d Cir. 1984).
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teering injury' requirement. . .goes farther than this elemen-
tary exposition of RICO. 36
The Second Circuit, however, attempted to bolster its con-
clusion by analyzing legislative history in order to understand
the scope of the private civil remedy.37 After considering the
available legislative history, the court concluded that Con-
gress was not aware of the possible implications of section
1964(c) since the private civil RICO provisions received little
attention from the House and Senate during the enactment of
the Organized Crime Control Act.3 8 The Second Circuit re-
ferred to the "clanging silence of legislative history. ' 39 It was
the combination of this perceived legislative silence and the
application of RICO in areas other than organized crime that
prompted the Second Circuit to construct the racketeering in-
jury requirement.4°
B. Prior Conviction Requirement
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Sedima further
restricted the scope of private civil RICO by holding that a
36. Haroco, 747 F.2d at 387.
37. Sedima S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 741 F.2d 482, 488 (2d Cir. 1984).
38. Id. at 488-92.
39. Id. at 492. According to the Second Circuit in Sedima:
The most important and evident conclusion to be drawn from the legislative
history is that Congress was not aware of the possible implications of section
1964(c). If Congress had intended to provide a federal forum for plaintiffs for so
many common law wrongs, it would at least have discussed it. If Congress had
intended to provide an alternate and more attractive scheme for private parties
to remedy violations of the securities laws-involving decades of statutes, regula-
tions, commentaries, and jurisprudence-it would at least have mentioned it.
The House Judiciary Committee, which authored the provision, would at least
have mentioned the amendment to the full House as a major change in its report
had there been any inkling of its possible implications."
Id.
40. Id. at 496. Some courts have taken exception to the Second Circuit's injury
conclusion. These courts find sufficient evidence in the Senate legislative history to sup-
port broad private civil RICO remedy. See Bennett v. Berg, 685 F.2d 1053, 1058 (8th
Cir. 1982), afl'd, 710 F.2d 1361 (1983) (en banc) (The panel stated that "[s]ection
1964(c) provides a private cause of action modelled on the antitrust laws," referring to
S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 80-82, 125, 160 (1969)). The dissent in Bankers
Trust noted that since Senator Hruska had included provisions for private equitable
relief and treble damages "in earlier versions of RICO, it is apparent that RICO's spon-
sors in the Senate were fully familiar with the implications of such private remedy."




prior criminal conviction for one of the predicate acts was a
prerequisite to the private RICO claim.41 Other courts, in-
cluding the Seventh Circuit, have rejected this requirement.42
Like the racketeering injury requirement debate, argu-
ments centered on the statutory language. The Second Circuit
Sedima majority maintained that the use of the word "viola-
tion" in section 1964(c) means conviction,4 3 but Judge
Cardamone, dissenting in Sedima, pointed out that the word
has also been used to designate civil wrongs in other situa-
tions.44 The Sixth Circuit commented that "Congress would
have defined the section 1964 violation differently had it de-
sired such a requirement. 45
The Sedima majority also argued that the legitimate busi-
nessperson, against whom a civil RICO claim was made
would be stigmatized as a racketeer as a result of a civil RICO
claim. For this reason at least a prior conviction should be
prerequisite to the claim.46 Judge Cardamone's dissent, how-
ever, suggested that the sensitivity to stigma was overstated
because the public would know the difference between a crimi-
nal conviction and a civil claim.47 Case law also indicates that
the mere potential of stigma does not transform a civil action
41. Sedima S.P.R.L. v. Imrex, Co., 741 F.2d 482, 503 (2d Cir. 1984), rev'd, 105 S.
Ct. 3275 (1985).
42. Banker Ramo Corp. v. United Bus. Farms, 713 F.2d 1272, 1286-87 (7th Cir.
1983).
43. Sedima, 741 F.2d at 498-99.
44. Sedima, 741 F.2d at 508 (Cardamone, J., dissenting).
45. USACO Coal Co. v. Carbomin Energy, Inc., 689 F.2d 94, 95 n.1 (6th Cir.
1982) ("We find nothing in the plain language of RICO to suggest that civil liability
under § 1964(c) is limited only to those already convicted or charged with criminal
racketeering activity.") See also Parnes v. Heinold Commodities, 487 F. Supp. 645, 647
(N.D. Ill. 1980); Farmers Bank v. Bell Mortgage Corp., 452 F. Supp. 1278, 1280 (D.
Del. 1978).
The language in section 1961 has also been subject to varying interpretations. The
Second Circuit majority in Sedima contended that "Congress did not intend to give civil
courts power to determine whether an act is 'indictable' in the absence of a properly
returned indictment or 'chargable' absent an information. . . that is the purpose of a
grand jury," so that in civil RICO suits, "every plaintiff becomes his own one-person
grand jury." Sedima, 741 F.2d at 500. In response, Judge Cardamone, dissenting in
Sedima, argued that the statute does not read "for which an indictment or information
has been returned or filed." Id. at 505 (Cardamone, J., dissenting).
46. Sedima, 741 F.2d at 499.
47. Id. at 508 (Cardamone, J., dissenting).
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into a criminal proceeding or require the invocation of crimi-
nal safeguards.48
IV. SEDIMA
The Second Circuit's questions on the civil RICO prereq-
uisites were ultimately resolved by the United States Supreme
Court. In Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co.,4 9 the Supreme
Court held that there is no prior conviction requirement for a
private action under 1964(c). The Court found no support in
the statute's language, legislative history, or considerations of
policy for the imposition of such a requirement.
Following a strict interpretation of the statutory language,
the Court noted that the word "conviction" does not appear
anywhere in the statute. According to the Court, the term
"violation" in 1964(c) does not imply a criminal conviction,
but "refers only to a failure to adhere to legal requirements.""0
The Court also determined that if there had been any intent
by Congress to impose such a "novel requirement, there
would have been at least some mention of it in the legislative
history, even if not in the statute."51 Furthermore, the Court
addressed concerns that RICO unfairly stigmatizes legitimate
businesses as racketeers by noting that "civil RICO leaves no
greater stain than do . other civil proceedings. 52
Finally, the Court noted that a prior conviction require-
ment conflicted with Congress' underlying policy concerns.
Potential plaintiffs serve as private attorney generals under
civil RICO, filling the prosecutorial gaps when the Govern-
ment itself pursues only civil remedies. "This purpose would
be largely defeated, and the need for treble damages as an in-
centive to litigate unjustified, if private suits could be main-
tained only against those already brought to justice. ' ' 3
48. See Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422 (1956).
49. 105 S. Ct. 3275 (1985). In American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Haroco, Inc.,
105 S. Ct. 3291, 3292 (1985), the Court issued a per curiam opinion consistent with its
decision rendered the same day in Sedima by merely requiring the RICO injury to flow
from the predicate acts themselves.
50. Id. at 3281.
51. Id. at 3282.




The Court also rejected any requirement that the success-
ful RICO plaintiff must establish some type of "racketeering
injury" instead of merely an injury from the predicate acts
themselves. According to the Court, the plain words of the
statute do not mention nor make room for a racketeering in-
jury requirement. When a plaintiff alleges each element of a
RICO violation, the compensable injury necessarily is the
harm caused by predicate acts sufficiently related to constitute
a pattern, for the essence of the violation is the commission of
those acts in connection with the conduct of an enterprise. 4
Therefore, recoverable damages stem from the commission of
the predicate acts, not some amorphous racketeering injury
concept."
The Court also recognized the vagueness of the racketeer-
ing injury concept and the struggle by the lower courts to de-
fine such an injury. The Court reviewed the legislative history
and rejected the Second Circuit's contention that section
1964(c) went through Congress unnoticed. Furthermore,
since the best indication of Congressional intent is the statu-
tory language itself, according to the Court, the plain lan-
guage of the RICO statute provides strong evidence that
Congress was cognizant of the broad implications of section
1964(c). As a result, even if the legislative history was charac-
terized by "clanging silence," the plain wording of the statute
would control. The Court then concluded that the plain stat-
utory language is certainly broader than the limits drawn by
the Second Circuit.16
Underlying the Court's rulings on these issues was its deci-
sion not to curtail Congress' "new method for fighting crime,"
but to read the civil RICO provisions in the spirit of "attack-
ing crime on all fronts."57 The Court observed that the appli-
cation of RICO to a wide variety of situations does not
necessarily mean RICO's provisions have been misconstrued
or are ambiguous, but merely suggests the breadth of RICO's
plain language and the Congressional intent underlying the
statute's provisions. The Court admitted that RICO had
54. Id. at 3286.
55. Id. at 3285.
56. Id. at 3285 n.3.
57. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Haroco, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 3291, 3292
(1985).
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evolved into something quite different from the legislature's
original conception of the statute, but declared that any de-
fects are "inherent in the statute as written and its correction
must lie with Congress. 58
Nevertheless, the Court then shifted the RICO contro-
versy to a new front. Justice White, writing for the majority,
stated that "[t]he 'extraordinary' uses to which civil RICO has
been put appear to be primarily the result of. . .the failure of
Congress and the courts to develop a meaningful concept of
'pattern.' "9 In dicta, the Court stressed that "two isolated
racketeering acts don't constitute a pattern" 60 and supported
this view by citing legislative history which states that "con-
tinuity plus relationship" combine to produce a pattern.6'
The Court's new emphasis on a heightened pattern re-
quirement is inconsistent with its rejection of the prior convic-
tion and racketeering injury requirements. As noted, the
Court's objection to the prior conviction and racketeering in-
jury prerequisites was based on a broad reading of the RICO
58. Sedima, 105 S. Ct. at 3287.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 3285 n.14.
61. The following is the full text of the Court's discussion of the pattern concept.
As many commentators have pointed out, the definition of a "pattern of
racketeering activity" differs from the other provisions in § 1961 in that it states
that a pattern "requires at least two acts of racketeering activity," § 1961(5) (em-
phasis added), not that it "means" two such acts. The implication is that while
two acts are necessary, they may not be sufficient. Indeed, in common parlance
two of anything do not generally form a "pattern." The legislative history sup-
ports the view that two isolated acts of racketeering activity do not constitute a
pattern. As the Senate Report explained: "The target of [RICO] is thus not
sporadic activity. The infiltration of legitimate business normally requires more
than one 'racketeering activity' and the threat of continuing activity to be effec-
tive. It is this factor of continuity plus relationship which combines to produce a
pattern." S. REP. No. 91-617, p. 158 (1969) (emphasis added). Similarly, the
sponsor of the Senate bill, after quoting the Report, pointed out to his colleagues
that "[t]he term 'pattern' itself requries the showing of a relationship. . . .So,
therefore, proof of two acts of racketeering activity, without more, does not es-
tablish a pattern . . . ." 116 CONG. REC. 18940 (1970) (statement of Sen. Mc-
Clellan). See also id. at 35193 (statement of Rep. Pofi0 (RICO "not aimed at the
isolated offender"); House Hearings, at 655. Significantly, in defining "pattern"
in a later provision of the same bill, Congress was more enlightening: "criminal
conduct forms a pattern if it embraces criminal acts that have the same or simi-
lar purposes, results, participants, victims, or methods of commission, or other-
wise are interrelated by distinguishing characteristics and are not isolated events.
18 U.S.C. § 3575(e) .. "
1986]
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language and motivated by a desire to permit the statute to
function as an effective tool in fighting organized crime. Nev-
ertheless, the Court's apparent mandate that the statute be
read broadly clashes with the Court's suggested heightened
pattern requirement; the pattern requirement reduces the
breadth of the RICO provisions.
There are other inconsistencies inherent in the Court's
new pattern requirement. Rejection of the prior conviction
and racketeering injury requirements was based on the ab-
sence of explicit statutory language calling for such limita-
tions. Although there is no explicit language in the RICO
statute requiring either "continuity" or "relatedness," the
Court nevertheless read these elements into the pattern con-
cept. Moreover, the Court relied heavily on the legislative his-
tory that supports the installation of the "continuity" and
"relatedness" elements into the pattern definition, but none-
theless failed to reconcile the part of legislative history which
does not confirm this determination.6 a
The Court itself declared that the correction of any defects
in the RICO statute is best left to Congress, but, incongru-
ously, then encourages the lower courts to develop a pattern
requirement. Thus, the Court's dicta accentuating the con-
tinuity and relationship characteristics of a pattern has re-
ceived increased scrutiny following Sedima. Most certainly
the "pattern" concept represents the next major issue in civil
RICO litigation.
62. Broad Pattern Definition in Criminal Cases Plays Havoc with Civil RICO Liti-
gation, Attorney says, 1 Civ. RICO Rep. No. 16, at 2 (Sept. 25, 1985). According to
Rep. Poff, "A 'pattern of racketeering activity' means simply two or more acts of racke-
teering activity, one of which. . . must have occurred subsequent to enactment of the
title." 116 CONG. REC. 35295 (1970). Therefore, it can be argued that the legislative
history cited by the Court is not so clear as to warrant expanding the perspicuous statu-
tory definition of a "pattern" when the statutes plain language does not contain any
references to "continuity" or "relationship." BROAD PATTERN DEFINITION IN CRIMI-
NAL CASES PLAY HAVOC WITH CIVIL RICO LITIGATION, ATTORNEY SAYS, 1 Civil
RICO Rep. No. 16, at 2 (Sept. 25, 1985). In addition, the fact that Congress included a
broad spectrum of acts in RICO's list of racketeering activities contradicts the require-
ment that the predicate acts be related to each other. Id.
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V. THE NEW CONTROVERSY
A. Relationship
Prior to the Supreme Court's dicta in Sedima, S.P.R.L. v.
Imrex,63 the lower courts disagreed on whether any relation-
ship between the predicate acts was necessary in order to es-
tablish a "pattern of racketeering." Even among those courts
instituting the relationship requirement, there were divergent
views on the particular type of relationship required. For in-
stance, some pre-Sedima courts simply presumed that two in-
dependent acts of racketeering, that is two predicate offenses,
occurring within a ten year period of each other constituted a
pattern of racketeering."
On the other hand, the Second 6 and Fifth66 Circuits per-
formed more thorough examinations of the pattern concept
and determined that it did not call for any type of relationship
among the predicate acts, but merely required a nexus be-
tween each predicate act and the enterprise. These courts
point out that the explicit statutory definition of a "pattern"
does not contain any reference to a "relatedness" compo-
nent.67 In addition, the incorporation of a relatedness factor
into the definition of a pattern would allow those organized
criminals engaged in diversified activities to escape RICO's
provisions.68 Since Congress enacted RICO in order to eradi-
cate organized crime, the inclusion of a relatedness factor into
63. 105 S. Ct. 3275 (1985).
64. See, e.g., Sutliff, Inc. v. Donovan Co., Inc., 727 F.2d 648 (7th Cir. 1984); Pit
Pros, Inc. v. Wolf, 554 F. Supp. 284, 285 (N.D. Ill. 1983); Lode v. Leonardo, 557 F.
Supp. 675, 681 (N.D. Ill. 1982).
65. See United States v. Weisman, 624 F.2d 1118 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
871 (1980).
66. See United States v. Phillips, 664 F.2d 971, 1011 (5th Cir. 1981); United States
v. Welch, 656 F.2d 1039, 1052 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 915 (1982); United
States v. Bright, 630 F.2d 804, 830 n.47 (5th Cir. 1980).
67. See, e.g., United States v. Elliott, 571 F.2d 880, 899 n.23 (5th Cir. 1978) ("[W]e
can perceive no reason for reading it into the statutory definition."); United States v.
DePalma, 461 F. Supp. 778, 782 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) ("The statutory definition of pattern
of racketeering activity is unambiguous and contains no reference to any requirement of
'relatedness'....")
68. Elliott, 571 F.2d at 899. "We would deny society the protection intended by
Congress were we to hold that the Act does not reach those enterprises nefarious
enough to diversify their criminal activity." Id.
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the "pattern" element would unduly restrict the scope of
RICO and frustrate the intention of Congress.69
The legislative history does not refer to a relationship be-
tween the predicate acts through a common scheme, but
merely reflects some concern to those commenting on the pro-
posed RICO bill that the two acts be somehow related in time.
The limitation requiring the commission of at least two acts of
racketeering within a ten year period was the only nexus be-
tween the predicate acts contemplated by Congress. In addi-
tion, the basic dictionary definition of a pattern implies
separate elements which constitute a whole.7 0 A statutory
scheme in which a pattern of racketeering activity is com-
posed of independent racketeering acts conforms with this
definition.7 1 Although some courts apply the extensive defini-
tion of a pattern in section 3575 to the meaning of pattern in
RICO,72 "the fact that the two sections were enacted simulta-
neously yet embody different definitions of pattern would
seem to indicate that Congress intentionally chose to use the
term differently in different contexts. 7 3
Despite these statutory indicators, there is pre-Sedima au-
thority requiring a relationship between the predicate acts in
order to comprise a pattern. 4 More specifically, the Seventh
and the Ninth Circuit's interpretation of a pattern encom-
passes two or more racketeering acts connected by a "com-
69. Id.
[we find nothing in the Act excluding from its ambit an enterprise engaged
in diversified activity. Indeed, Congress expressly stated that the purpose of the
Act was "to seek the eradication of organized crime," which it described as a
"highly sophisticated, diversified, and widespread activity that annually drains
billions of dollars from America's economy by unlawful conduct.
Id.
70. "[A] reliable sample of traits, acts, or other observable features characterizing
an individual." WEBsTER's NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 841 (1977).
71. DePalma, 461 F. Supp. at 784. "Indeed the dictionary definition of pattern,
whether in terms of a dress pattern or model, or a pattern of shot implies separate,
discrete elements which are placed together in a whole, a conception consistent with
Congress' intent to deal with organized crime." Id.
72. See supra notes 65-69.
73. Weisman, 624 F.2d at 1123.
74. See, e.g., United States v. Kaye, 556 F.2d 855, 860-61 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 921 (1977) (quoting White, 386 F. Supp. at 883-84).
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mon scheme, plan or motive,"75 and is hereinafter referred to
as the "common scheme approach."76 In other courts, simi-
lar results, participants,7 7 victims, 78 or methods of commis-
sion79 created a sufficient relationship between the predicate
acts so as to form a pattern. Absent such a relatedness prereq-
uisite, potential RICO plaintiffs can simply accumulate evi-
dence of sporadic and disconnected predicate offenses in order
to allege the two acts necessary to sustain a RICO cause of
action. The institution of a relatedness requirement would
substantially curtail the overinclusion problems that exist
under the statute.8 °
Proponents of incorporating the relatedness factor into the
definition of a pattern rely primarily on the legislative history
which indicates that "this fact of continuity plus relatedness
. . . combines to produce a pattern." '  Courts have also ar-
gued that "[i]n common usage, the term 'pattern' is applied to
a combination of qualities or acts forming a consistent or
characteristic arrangement, so that use of the term pattern
suggests a greater interrelationship than simply commission
by a common perpetrator. '8 2
In Sedima, the Supreme Court,in dicta, indicated that a
relationship factor is inherent in the pattern of racketeering, 83
but specifically stated that it was not deciding the pattern is-
sues. Nevertheless, the Court commented:
[In] defining 'pattern' in a later provision of the same bill,
Congress was more enlightening: "Criminal conduct forms
a pattern if it embraces criminal acts that have the same or
similar purposes, results, participants, victims, or methods of
75. United States v. Brooklier, 685 F.2d 1208, 1222 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied,
459 U.S. 1206 (1983). See also United States v. Starnes, 644 F.2d 673, 678 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 826 (1981).
76. United States v. Nacrelli, 468 F. Supp 241 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
77. United States v. Morris, 532 F.2d 436 (5th Cir. 1976).
78. United States v. Chovanec, 467 F. Supp. 41 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
79. United States v. Weatherspoon, 581 F.2d 595 (7th Cir. 1978)
80. White, 386 F. Supp. at 884 ("Absent a showing of a 'pattern' or interrelatedness
of such activity, § 1962(c) could be used against the isolated acts of an independent
criminal; such was not the intended target of the challenged statute.").
81. S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 158 (1969).
82. White, 386 F. Supp. at 883.
83. Sedima, 105 S. Ct. at 3285 n.14.
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commission, or otherwise are interrelated by distinguishing
characteristics and are not isolated events.",84
The Court's reference to this pattern provision in section 3575
seemed to imply that a similar definition of a pattern should
be instituted into RICO's pattern definition. This interpreta-
tion of relatedness is more broad than the Seventh and Ninth
Circuits "common scheme" approach, 85 since it appears that
two acts can be interrelated by certain characteristics, but not
necessarily have to emanate from the same scheme. In light of
this dicta, the post-Sedima decisions will be examined in order
to determine if the lower courts have picked up the Court's
suggestions or have continued to apply their pre-Sedima
precedents.
Thus far, reaction by the lower courts to the Sedima "rela-
tionship" dicta has varied. In Alexander Grant v. Tiffany In-
dustries,8 6 the Eighth Circuit, in dicta, utilized the section
3575(e) definition of "pattern" in order to satisfy the Sedima
Court's concerns that RICO not be extended to reach spo-
radic activity.87 Thus, the Sedima dicta regarding both the
relationship element of a pattern and the type of relationship
required among the predicate acts appears to have been per-
suasive to the Eighth Circuit.
In R.A. G.S. Couture, Inc. v. Hyatt, 88 the Fifth Circuit rec-
ognized that "the Supreme Court in Sedima implied that two
isolated acts would not constitute a pattern."8 9 Since the
predicate acts in the case at bar were related, the court re-
frained from further discussion of the relatedness issue.
Nonetheless, this dictum appears to have been purposely in-
cluded to forewarn of the court's changed attitude toward the
relatedness question.
On the other hand, certain district courts within the juris-
diction of the Second Circuit have been reluctant to follow the
Sedima dicta and, instead, appear bound by the controlling
precedents in their circuit. The Second Circuit, prior to
Sedima, had not required the predicate acts to be related to
84. Id.
85. See infra note 108 and accompanying text.
86. 770 F.2d 717 (8th Cir. 1985).
87. Id. at 718 n.1.
88. 774 F.2d 1350 (5th Cir. 1985).
89. Id. at 1355.
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each other in terms of possessing a unitary character.9° In Eq-
uitable Life Assurance Society v. Alexander Grant,91 the dis-
trict court completely ignored any reference to the Sedima
relationship dicta in its discussion of whether a unified scheme
among the predicate acts was required; instead, the court re-
ferred to existing Second Circuit precedent which does not re-
quire such relatedness. In fact, the court incorrectly
interpreted the Supreme Court's dicta in Sedima. The district
court opined that the Sedima dicta addressed the question of
whether more than two predicate acts must be alleged to sus-
tain a RICO claim, or whether two alleged acts by themselves
would be sufficient. 92 The court concluded that it did not
need to reach that issue since the plaintiff alleged three sepa-
rate acts of mail fraud.
The Alexander Grant court grossly misconstrued the
Court's language in Sedima that pattern requires at least two
predicate acts; it does not necessarily mean two predicate
acts. 93 The distinction between means and requires reflects on
the quality of the pattern relationship, not merely the quantity
of predicate acts. The Court in Sedima was attempting to
demonstrate that the proof of two isolated acts is not enough
to form a pattern, but that "continuity plus a relationship"
between the predicate acts is also essential to a pattern. The
Grant court, bound by the doctrine of stare decisis, has dis-
torted the Court's dicta in Sedima in order to follow the prior
decisions in the Second Circuit.
In contrast, the district court in Conan Properties, Inc. v.
Mattel, Inc.,94 quoting Sedima, held that "two isolated acts of
racketeering activity do not constitute a pattern. '95 The rul-
ing eliminated alleged securities violations incurred between
1970 and 1974 from the pattern of mail and wire fraud acts
which occured from 1980 through 1982 because the securities
offenses were unrelated to the mail and wire fraud predicate
acts. This case is significant because the court's holding devi-
90. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
91. No. 85 Civ. 3595 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 23, 1985). See also United States v. Louie,
No. 84 Cr. 1025 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 26, 1985).
92. Alexander Grant, No. 85 Civ 3595.
93. Accord Sedima, 105 S. Ct. at 3285 n.14.




ates from the pre-Sedima precedent in the Second Circuit
which did not require a unified scheme among the predicate
acts.
96
These post-Sedima district court cases in the Second Cir-
cuit indicate that Sedima has created confusion, uncertainty
and lack of uniformity with regard to the relatedness require-
ment within that one circuit. However, the Second Circuit's
apparent desire to narrow the scope of the RICO statute as
evidenced by its previous construction of the prior conviction
and racketeering injury limitations, would suggest that a rela-
tionship requirement will be established by that circuit.
The Supreme Court's emphasis on the relationship be-
tween predicate acts has reinforced the position of those
courts which already required a unitary character among
predicate acts. However, most courts do not appear to have
adopted the more expansive interpretation of relationship as
defined in section 3575(e) and cited by the Supreme Court,
opting instead for the common scheme interpretation. 97
B. Continuity
Courts are divided in regard to the extent racketeering ac-
tivities must be separate and independent so that a pattern of
continuing conduct is formed rather than a single criminal
event. The vast majority of pre-Sedima courts have held that
two acts of racketeering emanating from a single scheme, 98 a
96. One court in the District of Columbia has, however, embraced the section
3575(e) definition. Foltz v. U.S. News & World Report, 108 F.R.D. 57 (D.D.C. 1985).
According to this post-Sedima decision, a pattern is constituted by predicate acts which
are interrelated by results, participants, victims or other distinguishing characteristics.
97. See, e.g., United States v. Watchmaker, 761 F.2d 1459, 1474-76 (11th Cir.
1985); Alcorn County v. U.S. Interstate Supplies, 731 F.2d 1160, 1168 (5th Cir. 1984);
United States v. Starnes, 644 F.2d 673, 678 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 826 (1981)
(pursuant to one scheme, interstate travel to commit arson, the actual act of arson, and
use of mail after the arson were separate acts of racketeering and combined to produce a
pattern); United States v. Karas, 624 F.2d 500, (4th Cir. 1980) (payment of a single
bribe in three installments); United States v. Weatherspoon, 581 F.2d 595, 602 (7th Cir.
1978) (multiple mailings in the furtherance of a single scheme constituted a pattern)
(No evidence that RICO "require[s] a showing of separate and unrelated schemes, as a
precondition for finding two indictable 'get' . . . that would constitute a 'pattern of
racketeering activity' under [RICO]."); United States v. Parness, 503 F.2d 430, 441-42
(2d Cir. 1974) (interstate transportation of stolen securities as part of a single scheme to
defraud), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1105 (1975).
98. United States v. Phillips, 664 F.2d 971, 1038 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 457
U.S. 1136 (1982) (separate acts "need not, however, be in the context of independent
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single episode,99 or even a single criminal act I00 constituted a
pattern. According to these courts, each separately indictable
predicate offense constituted a racketeering act, and the com-
mission of two or more racketeering acts comprised a pat-
tern,101 even though the predicate offenses might overlap in
terms of time, victims, or modus operandi.10 2
In Sedima, the Supreme Court suggested in dicta that
"continuity plus relationship" combines to produce a pattern.
The impact of this continuity factor on lower courts' decisions
in the post-Sedima era will now be analyzed. More specifi-
cally, several sub-issues of the continuity requirement will be
examined in light of mail fraud cases.
First, do two mailings pursuant to the ame scheme consti-
tute the threat of continuing activity envisioned by Congress?
Is the threat of continuing activity evidenced by two separate
criminal acts pursuant to a commonscheme? Finally, does the
threat of continuing activity require multiple schemes?10 3
Lower courts have differed in their responses to the
Supreme Court's dicta concerning the continuity factor. Cir-
cuit court activity subsequent to the Sedima decision has been
schemes or objectives."); United States v. Calabrese, 645 F.2d 1379, 1389 (10th Cir.) (a
pattern was formed even though the acts "were between the same parties and [arguably]
constituted 'a single customer transaction.' "), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1018 (1981);
Starnes, 644 F.2d at 678; United States v. Morelli; 643 F.2d 402 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
453 U.S. 912 (1981); United States v. Karas, 624 F.2d 500, 504 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 1078 (1980); Harper v. New Japan Sec. Int'l, 545 F. Supp. 1002, 1004 (C.D.
Cal. 1982) ("Each act of criminal activity is counted. . . even if numerous acts arise
out of the same episode.")
99. United States v. Moeller, 402 F. Supp. 49, 58 (D. Conn. 1975) ("A 'pattern' can
apparently be established in this Circuit by two acts occurring on the same day in the
same place and forming part of the same criminal episode.")
100. Haroco, Inc. v. American Nat'l Bank, 747 F.2d 384, 387 (7th Cir. 1984), affid,
105 S. Ct. 3291 (1985).
101. For example, multiple mailings constituting two separately indictable racke-
teering acts of mail fraud formed a pattern, even though the mailings originated from
the same scheme or same criminal episode. United States v. Sampson, 371 U.S. 75
(1962). Likewise, one court has held that charges of mail and wire fraud arising out of a
common factual nucleus comprised a pattern. Beth Israel Medical Center v. Smith, 576
F. Supp. 1061 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). The court relied on the literal language of the statute
and what it considered to be the common sense interpretation of a pattern. Id. The
Beth Israel court failed to consider the legislative history that stresses "continuity"
among the predicate acts.
102. See supra note 61.
103. Kaplan, Civil RICO After Sedima: An Overview, ALI-ABA VIDEO LAW RE-
VIEV STUDY MATERIALS, 41, 77 (1985).
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limited. In R.A.G.S. Couture, Inc. v. Hyatt,1°4 the Fifth Cir-
cuit, recognizing that Sedima implied that two isolated racke-
teering acts would not constitute a pattern, nevertheless
completely ignored the continuity factor in holding that any
two related acts of mail fraud comprise a pattern. The Sev-
enth Circuit, in Illinois Department of Revenue v. Phillips,10 5
without any reference or discussion of the Sedima continuity
dicta, followed pre-Sedima precedents that ignored the con-
tinuity element so that nine related acts of mail fraud consti-
tuted the requisite pattern. Thus, the Sedima dicta with
regard to the continuity element does not appear to have been
persuasive to the Fifth and Seventh Circuit Courts.
The continuity dicta and supporting reasoning, however,
has been more persuasive to the Eighth Circuit. In Alexander
Grant & Co. v. Tiffany, 1 6 the Eighth Circuit stated, in dicta,
that multiple acts of mail and wire fraud in the furtherance of
a single audit scheme to defraud bespeaks a sufficient con-
tinuity to satisfy the Supreme Court's concerns in Sedima that
RICO not encompass sporadic activity.
The most extensive post-Sedima activity regarding the
continuity factor has occurred within the District Court for
Northern Illinois. In this district, a variety of conflicting
views of the Sedima dicta and the continuity factor has
emerged, providing an excellent opportunity to evaluate devel-
oping judicial solutions to the problem. On one extreme, in
Aetna v. Levy,10 7 the district court ignored the Supreme
Court's continuity discussion and held that two acts of mail
fraud within a ten year period pursuant to a single scheme
established a pattern of racketeering activity. Similarly, in
Systems Research v. Random, Inc.,1°8 the court also ignored
the continuity requirement, merely requiring that the acts be
listed in the statute and "sufficiently related" to each other.
104. No. 84-3827 (5th Cir. Oct. 30, 1985) (the mailing of two false invoices regard-
ing the ownership and repair of certain equipment in an attempt to defraud repair of
certain equipment in an company constituted a pattern).
105. 771 F.2d 312 (7th Cir. 1985).
106. 770 F.2d 717 (8th Cir. 1985).
107. No. 83 Civ. 3566 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 7, 1985).
108. 614 F. Supp. 494 (N.D. Ill. 1985).
[Vol. 69:395
RICO BEFORE AND AFTER SEDIMA
However, in Northern Trust Bank v. Inryco, Inc.,10 9 a trial
judge, interpreting the Supreme Court's "unmistakable sig-
nal,"' 10 determined that more than one fraudulent scheme is
necessary in order to comply with the continuity factor of a
pattern. Since Sedima "creates a whole new ballgame," the
court declared that it was "no longer obligated to follow con-
trary Court of Appeals opinions" in which two related acts
pursuant to one scheme were sufficient."' As a result, the
court ruled that two specific acts of mail fraud made in con-
nection with one fraudulent scheme involving a phony sub-
contract, without any facts to infer continuous activity, did
not satisfy Sedima's continuity requirement. Other trial
judges within the district have followed the multiple scheme
approach developed in Inryco,112 but Inryco was the first
court, before or after Sedima, to establish such a requirement.
The district court judges in Trak Microcumputer Corp. v.
Wearne Brothers1 1 3 and Graham v. Slaughter"' follow the
109. 615 F. Supp. 828 (N.D. 111. 1985).
110. Id. at 833. "[Sedima's] message was both plain and deliberate: Lower courts
concerned about RICO's expansive potential would be best advised to focus on the hith-
erto largely ignored 'pattern' concept." Id.
111. Id. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals had established a relatedness re-
quirement in order to constitute a pattern. In Starnes, 644 F.2d at 677-78, the court
held that actions taken in furtherance of a single criminal end are sufficiently related to
satisfy the "pattern requirement." In Weatherspoon, 581 F.2d at 601-02, the court re-
jected a requirement that the predicate acts must be performed pursuant to separate
criminal episodes. The Inryco court reanalyzed these decisions in light of Sedima:
In logical terms, such cases as Starnes and Weatherspoon were only partly
right in flushing out the concept of "pattern." True enough, "pattern" connotes
similarity, hence the cases' proper emphasis on relatedness of the constituent
acts. But "pattern" also connotes a multiplicity of events: Surely the continuity
inherent in the term presumes repeated criminal activity, not merely repeated
acts to carry out the same criminal activity.
Inryco, 615 F. Supp. at 831 (emphasis in original).
112. See Fagenholz v. AMF Inc., No. 85 Civ. 3456 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 5, 1985). The
plaintiff's allegations of a single an fraudulent transaction committed against him and
an unsubstantiated belief that similar frauds may have been committed against third
parties does not suffice to establish a "pattern." Murlas Commodities, Inc. v. Borman,
No. 85 Civ. 09640 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 19, 1985); United States v. Yonan, 622 F. Supp. 721
(N.D. Ill. 1985).
One district court outside of the Northern District of Illinois appears to have fol-
lowed Inryco. Kredietbank v. Morris, No. 84-1903 (D.N.J. Oct. 11, 1985) (court's em-
phasis on multiple lawsuits seems to imply the Inryco multiple scheme approach).
113. No. 84 Civ. 7970 (N.D. III. Oct. 25, 1985).
114. No. 84 Civ. 7881 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 27, 1985).
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dicta in Sedima but disagree with Inryco's elucidation of the
concept.
In Graham, the court agreed with the Inryco court that
prior pre-Sedima Seventh Circuit decisions in which multiple
mailings in furtherance of a single criminal episode or transac-
tion constitute a pattern should not be followed. However,
the court rejected Inryco's conclusion that multiple mailings
pursuant to a single scheme can never establish a pattern of
racketeering activity. The Graham court attributes the differ-
ence to the Inryco court's "implication that a single fraudulent
effort or episode should be equated with a single scheme."11 5
In contrast, the Graham court defined continuity in terms of
multiple transactions, somewhat separated in time and
place."'16 The fact that criminal events or transactions may re-
late to one scheme or multiple schemes is irrelevant. The
court relies on the legislative history 1 7 statutory language and
the dicta in Sedima for support of its interpretation.
In order to differentiate racketeering acts which consti-
tuted repeated criminal transactions from those acts that were
repeated to carry out the same criminal transaction, the court
evaluated the perpetrators' objective intent by considering
whether the act appeared to be "independently motivated
crimes," or appeared to be ministerial acts performed in the
execution of a single fraudulent transaction. The court then
held that twenty predicate acts of embezzlement, stretched
over a two year period and performed in the execution of a
single scheme to defraud a company of its funds comprised
twenty independently motivated crimes. In comparison, the
court classified the two acts of mail fraud pursuant to the sin-
115. Id. See also Trak, No. 84 Civ. 7970 ("This court does not agree with the
suggestion that a 'pattern of racketeering activity' cannot be established with respect to
a single fraudulent scheme.").
116. Frye v. First Nat'l Bank of Niles, No. 85 Civ. 0700 (N.D. I11. Dec. 3, 1985)
("[T]he pattern requirement requires a series of criminal episodes sufficiently separated
in time and place to establish the threat of continuing activity; it does not, however,
require a pattern of separate fraudulent schemes.").
117. Graham, No. 84 Civ. 7881 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 27, 1985) ("Nothing in the legisla-
tive history of RICO . . . compels the conclusion that a 'pattern of racketeering' re-
quires a pattern of fraudulent schemes."). See also Allington v. Carpenter, 619 F.
Supp. 474, 478 (C.D. Cal. 1985) ("[I]mportantly, it is the only construction which give
meaning to Congress' intended rejection of RICO liability predicated upon isolated or
sporadic criminal acts. The legislative history contains repeated references to such a
limitation.")
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gle scheme in Inryco as ministerial acts rather than indepen-
dently motivated crimes.'18
Outside of the District Court for Northern Illinois, there
has not been much activity regarding the continuity factor.
One court in the Eastern District of New York, in Rojas v.
First National Bank Association,1 9 established an approach to
the continuity factor which required "a showing of at least
two predicate acts and the threat of continuing activity."12 0
The court did not define what constitutes a threat of continu-
ing activity, so that it appears under this test that two racke-
teering acts pursuant to a single transaction and single scheme
would comprise a pattern.
The Supreme Court's discussion of continuity was com-
pletely ignored by a district court judge in Northeast Womens
Center, Inc. v. Monagle 1 2 1 where multiple racketeering acts
committed on the same date at the same time was sufficient to
sustain a RICO claim in spite of the fact that the racketeering
acts were not executed in a series of episodes, events or
schemes which were ongoing.
C. Analysis
Defining a pattern of racketeering activity in a manner re-
quiring a relationship between the racketeering acts prevents
potential plaintiffs from merely aggregating two or more iso-
lated and independent predicate offenses in order to initiate a
RICO claim.1 22 The relatedness factor is consistent with Con-
118. The Graham court's emphasis on transactions rather than schemes was also
followed in Morgan v. Bank of Waukegan, 615 F. Supp. 836 (N.D. I1.1985) (single plot
spread over several years does not satisfy the pattern requirement articulated by Inryco).
Courts outside the Northern District of Illinois that followed Inryco include Profes-
sional Assets Mgt., 616 F. Supp. 1418 (W.D. Ok. 1985) (predicate acts arising from one
engagement to perform one audit were part of a single unified transaction and did not
constitute a pattern); Allington v. Carpenter, 619 F. Supp. 474, 478 (C.D. Cal. 1985)
("[A] 'pattern' of racketeering activity must include racketeering acts sufficiently uncon-
nected in time or substance to warrant consideration as separate criminal episodes. The
acts of wire fraud alleged in the complaint do not meet this standard. Each act was a
part of the same criminal transaction.").
119. 613 F. Supp. 968 (E.D.N.Y. 1985).
120. Id. at 971 n.1.
121. No. 85-4845 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 25, 1985).
122. "For example, a corporate defendant may have been found guilty of violating
a federal campaign contribution law ten years before allegedly engaging in a deceptive
avertising scheme. Plaintiff may argue that these were both frauds, thereby constituting
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gress' intent to eradicate continuing, nonsporadic activity.
The RICO statute itself, clearly requires the finding of a pat-
tern. Since all language in a statute should be treated as sig-
nificant, 123 the relatedness requirement would give meaning to
the "pattern" element.
The Sedima interpretation of pattern will substantially re-
strict the breadth of the statute's application. However, there
is concern that imposition of a relatedness requirement will
result in a failure to reach organized criminals who are able to
diversify their activities. Thus the precise definition of relat-
edness still needs to be refined. A relationship defined in
terms of a common scheme, or plan is more restrictive than a
connection involving an interrelationship of distinguishing
characteristics, and therefore, constitutes a greater limitation
on the scope of RICO.
Congress, and the Sedima Court, also considered con-
tinuity to be an important component of a pattern since "[t]he
threat of infiltration of legitimate business normally requires
• . .the threat of continuing activity to be effective." '24 The
Inryco multiple schemes requirement is one interpretation of
the continuity factor. Under Inryco, since more than one re-
lated predicate act performed in the furtherance of one
scheme would not constitute a pattern, the multiple schemes
approach does eliminate from the purview of RICO the situa-
tion in which multiple mailings are made pursuant to a single
fraudulent scheme. Application of RICO to the multiple
mailings, single scheme scenario has been troublesome be-
cause the two mailings are, in reality, merely ministerial acts
performed with regard to one independently motivated crime.
Multiple ministerial acts performed in executing one criminal
event does not implicate the threat of continuing criminal ac-
tivity envisioned by Congress.
However, the Inryco test might allow bona fide racketeers
to avoid RICO since a defendant would be allowed "to com-
mit a dozen related fraudulent acts in pursuit of a single grand
a pattern." Nathan & Bograd, RICO Litigation's New Battleground: "Pattern" and
"Enterprise," ALI-ABA VIDEO LAW REVIEW STUDY MATERIALS, 143, 155 (1985).
123. M. ROMBAUER, LEGAL PROBLEM SOLVING 78 (4th ed. 1983).
124. Sedima, 105 S. Ct. at 3285 n.14.
[Vol. 69:395
RICO BEFORE AND AFTER SEDIMA
scheme, such as infiltrating one corporation." 125 Clearly, In-
ryco's approach frustrates Congress' attempt to shield legiti-
mate business from any infiltration by racketeers.
Compared to the Inryco approach, the continuity require-
ment established by the court in Graham is more comprehen-
sive. The Graham Court focused on multiple transactions
rather than multiple schemes. Graham defined a criminal
transaction as an independently motivated crime, so that mul-
tiple mailings pursuant to a single scheme would not be within
the scope of RICO since they would be characterized as min-
isterial acts pursuant to one criminal transaction. In contrast
to Inryco, the test would not exclude a bona fide racketeer
who has a scheme to infiltrate a business through many trans-
actions. This test, however, lacks a sufficient definition of ex-
actly what constitutes ministerial acts performed in the
futherance of one criminal event as opposed to activity consti-
tuting an independent transaction. The consequences of this
loophole is that a potential plaintiff can merely allege that the
predicate acts occurred in discrete criminal episodes, while the
defense will contend that predicate acts, especially those oc-
curring within a short period of time of each other, were part
of the same criminal transaction. This distinction would most
certainly be subject to intense litigation.
The relatedness and continuity factors have been ap-
proached as mutually exclusive requirements of a pattern.
However, these elements may in fact overlap; predicate acts
related to a common scheme will look more like a single crim-
inal transaction rather than multiple criminal events.12 6 Con-
sequently, it will be harder to establish continuity under the
Graham test when there is a single criminal scheme. On the
other hand, since the Inryco continuity test requires multiple
schemes, this fusion will not be a problem.
Evaluation of the relatedness and continuity elements to-
gether illustrates a major flaw with the Inryco court's multiple
scheme pattern model. Under Inryco, the multiple scheme re-
quirement necessary to demonstrate continuity would be in-
125. Kaplan, supra note 103.
126. BROAD PATTERN DEFINITION IN CRIMINAL CASES PLAYS HAVOC WITH




consistent with requiring all the predicate acts to be connected
through a common scheme in order to satisfy the relationship
element of pattern. The Inryco test, therefore, ignores Con-
gress' relationship element. However, the Inryco court did
emphasize that pattern connotes similarity as well as multi-
plicity of events. Therefore, it appears that only the predicate
acts performed in the furtherance of each scheme need to be
related. Because each scheme must be independent and unre-
lated to the other, the Inryco test would not exclude two iso-
lated acts performed in two independent schemes from the
RICO provisions.
For example, one act of bribery committed nine years ago
that is independent and unrelated to one act of mail fraud
committed today would satisfy the Inryco test since each was
performed pursuant to an independent scheme. In spite of the
lack of relatedness between schemes, under Inryco this iso-
lated activity would constitute a RICO violation. Thus, the
Inryco test should be rejected because its application in certain
situations ignores the relatedness factor stressed by the Court
and expressed in the legislative history.
VI. CONCLUSION
The statutory language of RICO is unambiguous and in
the absence of a clearly expressed legislative intent to the con-
trary, that language must be regarded as conclusive. There is
no express legislative history which clearly supports an organ-
ized crime nexus, a competitive injury requirement, or a prior
conviction prerequisite. Therefore, the Sedima Court prop-
erly refused to restrict the reach of the statute with these
limitations.
In constructing the statute, Congress balanced the impor-
tance of broad language necessary to ensnare organized crime
against the risk that legitimate businesses would also be sub-
ject to RICO liability. Congress decided in favor of broad
construction. The fact that RICO is applied in unanticipated
situations reflects the breadth of the statutory terms, not am-
biguity. Judicially imposed standing barriers might have fore-
closed application of the statute to the target of the statute,
organized crime.
Nonetheless, it has been asserted that even Congress may
not have recognized all of the possible applications of RICO.
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As a result, the Sedima Court encouraged the imposition of
continuity and relationship elements on the statute's pattern
of racketeering concept. This judicial legislation has resulted
in disparate treatment of similar RICO cases, such as those
involving mail fraud. This disparity is a serious problem be-
cause of the severe penalties involved. Therefore, if Congress,
in fact, did not intend to permit the resulting applications of
RICO, Congress is the proper authority to rectify any
problems. Judicially created standing and pattern require-
ments represent unauthorized attempts to rewrite the statute
and disturb the policy. These choices more correctly belong to
Congress. 127
Therefore, Congress should undertake a study and ex-
amine whether RICO is working. The question to be resolved
is whether the statute has been effective in eradicating the eco-
nomic base of organized crime and at what cost in terms of
subjecting legitimate business to liability.
Congress would be well advised to abolish the entire
RICO scheme or restrict the scope of the statutory language
in order to achieve a more equitable balancing between the
risk of overinclusion and the availability of RICO as a weapon
in fighting organized crime. If, in fact, the statute is not meet-
ing its objectives, a more equitable balancing could be accom-
plished in a number of ways. The statute's application could
be restricted by increasing the number of predicate offenses
necessary to constitute a pattern. In addition, Congress could
eliminate some of the predicate offenses from the list provided
in section 1961. Congress could also provide a more thorough
definition of a pattern. In any event, Congress must act to
resolve the controversy. The decision is theirs.
JAMES A. DOERING
127. Moss v. Morgan Stanley Inc., 553 F. Supp. 1347, 1359 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd on
other grounds, 719 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1983) (it's not the judiciary's role to reassess Con-
gress' balance of costs and benefits of RICO).
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